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v. 
 
KENNETH KILSON, 
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Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY JR., and O‟MALLEY*, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 04, 2012) 
    
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
    
 
O‟MALLEY, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Kathleen M. O‟Malley, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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Kenneth Kilson seeks to appeal his conviction following a jury trial for conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C 
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846.  Kilson‟s counsel has filed an Anders brief in which he 
states there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal.  Kilson has also filed a pro se brief.  
We agree with counsel that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal and affirm.
*
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 On August 11, 2008, Anthony Comegys mailed three kilograms of cocaine in a 
U.S. Priority package from El Paso, Texas, addressed to Mary Butler, 169 State Street, 
Apt. 31, Dover, Delaware 19901.  Law enforcement became aware of the package on 
August 12, 2008, when Tennessee drug interdiction agent, Rhett Campbell, stopped a 
vehicle for speeding on Interstate 40 in Hickman, Tennessee.  Cassandra Norton was 
driving the vehicle and Comegys was sitting in the passenger seat. 
 Agent Campbell was given consent to search the vehicle where he found packing 
supplies regularly used for drug packaging, including a vacuum seal machine, vacuum 
seal bags, and saran wrap.  A drug-detecting K-9 also alerted Agent Campbell to $17,400 
in Norton‟s purse.  Agent Campbell then found a receipt and confirmation tracking slip 
for the U.S Priority package Comegys sent from El Paso to Dover in Comegys‟ luggage.  
Agent Campbell contacted U.S. Postal Inspectors and provided them with the tracking 
                                              
*
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C § 3742.  While the government notes that this appeal is 
untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), it does not assert the 
untimeliness as a grounds for dismissal.  See Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327-29 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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number associated with the package.  Comegys was released without being informed that 
the receipt had been found. 
 On August 14, 2010, U.S. Postal Inspectors obtained and executed a warrant to 
search the package linked to the tracking slip in Comegys‟ luggage.  The postal 
inspectors discovered the three kilograms of cocaine.  Since the package was mailed on 
August 11, it was expected to arrive at its destination on August 13 or 14.  Beginning on 
August 13, Kilson and Jeffery Daniels made numerous phones calls to the U.S Postal 
facility near Dover, Delaware, the main U.S. Postal Service number, as well as to 
Comegys.   
During one call to the U.S. Postal Service on August 14, someone using a phone 
linked to Kilson entered the first sixteen digits of the cocaine package‟s tracking number.  
During another phone call, someone claiming to be Daniels called the Post Office and 
requested that the package be delivered to 1679 South State Street, Lot 31, Dover, 
Delaware, 19901, not to 169 State Street as it was currently addressed. 
 Law enforcement officers subsequently replaced the three kilograms of cocaine in 
the package with 2.9 kilograms of a substance resembling the drug, while leaving 100 
grams of actual cocaine in the package, and devised a plan to make a controlled delivery 
to the trailer at 1679 South State Street.  An undercover officer, with package in tow, 
knocked on the door at 1679 South State Street and, when he received no response,  
placed a delivery slip on the door of the trailer.  As undercover agents continued their 
surveillance of the trailer, Kilson arrived alone at the trailer, retrieved the delivery slip 
from the door, and left in his Mercedes.   
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Kilson picked up Daniels and they drove together to the U.S Post Office in Dover, 
Delaware.  While Kilson waited in the Mercedes, Daniels left the car and met an 
unidentified woman.  The woman went into the post office, returned with some mail she 
handed to Daniels, and Kilson and Daniels drove off and returned to 1679 South State 
Street. 
 An undercover officer later returned to 1679 South State Street to deliver the 
package.  The undercover officer knocked on the door and Kilson and Daniels answered 
the door together.  Kilson retrieved the delivery slip and handed it to the undercover 
officer.  Daniels signed for the package and took it into the trailer.  Almost immediately, 
Daniels left the house and placed the package in the back seat of Kilson‟s Mercedes 
parked in front of the trailer, and returned inside.  Shortly thereafter, Kilson left the trailer 
and sat in the driver‟s seat of his Mercedes. 
 As agents wearing vests marked “police” began to converge on Kilson and 
Daniels, Kilson drove away.  He began driving at a normal rate of speed, but he 
attempted to flee when law enforcement officers converged on his car.  Kilson slammed 
his Mercedes into a police vehicle that blocked his forward progress.  As agents wearing 
clothing marked “police” and “DEA” ran toward Kilson‟s Mercedes, he put his car in 
reverse and crashed into another police vehicle.  Kilson subsequently was arrested and 
police confiscated a cell phone that they later linked to many of the calls to the U.S. 
Postal Service and Comegys.  Daniels was arrested nearby after fleeing on foot. 
 Agents later executed a search warrant on the trailer at 1679 South State Street. 
During the search, agents found approximately 78 grams of crack cocaine in the freezer. 
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On the kitchen counter was a small baggie containing crack cocaine, a box of baking 
soda, an electric hot plate with cocaine residue, and a digital scale.  Agents also found 
another cell phone that had been used previously to conduct wire transfers and make calls 
related to the package.  They later linked this additional cell phone to Kilson. 
 Post-arrest, Kilson‟s jail house phone calls were recorded.  On those, he described 
how law enforcement discovered the mailing and its contents.  He also discussed an 
arrest in Nashville that led the police to the postal receipt for the package, said that the 
person arrested had failed to tip Kilson off that the plan had been compromised, and 
concluded that the person arrested had “told on [him].”  Kilson also revealed that he was 
working on Daniels not to “break on me” or “crack,” but said he felt that it appeared 
inevitable.  Kilson, additionally, was recorded discussing the fact that the police had 
found 78 grams of crack cocaine in the trailer, but said that it was “lightweight,” 
“nothing,” and “they ain‟t even saying nothing about that.”  Finally, Kilson also was 
recorded stating that he had been set-up by Daniels.  Kilson proceeded to trial on April 
30, 2009. 
 During Kilson‟s trial, one of the jurors reported that she heard other jurors making 
“negative comments” about the defense attorney.  At defense counsel‟s urging, the 
District Court inquired about the matter in camera, without the attorneys present.  The 
District Court spoke with the juror who overheard the comment.  She stated that she 
heard another juror call the defense attorney “an idiot or something like that.”  The 
District Court then questioned the juror who was accused of making the comment, but 
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she denied having done so.  The juror also insisted that she had not yet made any 
determination about the innocence or guilt of Kilson. 
 The District Court recounted the statements of the jurors to the attorneys.  Defense 
counsel expressed concern about the original juror‟s apparent error regarding overhearing 
the comment, noted that there might be “something wrong with her,” and moved to strike 
her from the panel.  The District Court denied the motion.   
The jury ultimately found Kilson guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 
and 846.
†
  The District Court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term of ten years 
of imprisonment and eight years of supervised release.   
The District Court made its sentencing determination on the record and, taking the 
210 to 262 month range as a starting point, varied downward to the mandatory minimum.  
Kilson initially objected to having the 78 grams of crack cocaine found in Daniels‟ trailer 
considered during sentencing because he was not convicted of possession.  The District 
Court reasoned, however, that, given Kilson‟s substantial role in the conspiracy and his 
connection to the trailer and the overall conspiracy, it was proper to consider it.  The 
Court also considered Kilson‟s young age and difficult family background.  Taking all of 
this into account, it departed downward and sentenced Kilson to the mandatory minimum 
of 120 months.  Kilson now appeals. 
 
 
                                              
†
 Daniels pled guilty to the same charge. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 On April 6, 2012, Kilson‟s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, claiming that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and asking this 
Court to allow him to withdraw as counsel.  In Anders, the Supreme Court set out the 
process for an attorney to withdraw from a case in which the indigent criminal defendant 
he represents wishes to pursue a meritless appeal.  If counsel finds an appeal to be 
“wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it,” he should seek permission to 
withdraw.  Id. at 744.  “The request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring 
to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,” the so-called Anders 
brief.  Id.  The appellate court must then determine, “after a full examination of all the 
proceedings,” whether counsel‟s assertion of a meritless appeal is correct.  Id.  If it is, the 
court may grant counsel‟s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.  Id. 
The Third Circuit has embraced the Supreme Court‟s guidelines in its local 
appellate rules: 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the 
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to 
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), which  must be served upon the appellant and the United States.  The 
United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant may also file a brief in 
response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the clerk will refer the case to a 
merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant 
counsel‟s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new 
counsel. 
3d. Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  Our inquiry on this motion is thus “twofold:  (1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule‟s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
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review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241. F.3d 
296, 300 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
The first question often turns on the adequacy of counsel‟s Anders brief.  To fulfill 
the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), the Anders brief must (1) “satisfy the 
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” 
and (2) “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.  While counsel 
must examine the record conscientiously, he need not raise and refute every possible 
claim.  See id. 
To perform our independent review of the record, we must determine whether “the 
appeal lacks any basis in law or fact.”  McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 
438 n.10 (1988).”  Whether an issue is frivolous is informed by the standard of review for 
each potential claim raised.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 
2002).  We need not scour the record on our review.  “Where the Anders brief initially 
appears adequate on its face, the proper course „is for the appellate court to be guided in 
reviewing the record by the Anders brief itself.‟”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 301. (citing United 
States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.1996)).  If the Anders brief is inadequate, we 
may seek guidance on potential issues for appeal from defendant‟s pro se brief or other 
court filings.  See id.  Regardless of the adequacy of the Anders Brief, we may affirm the 
District Court without appointing new counsel if the frivolousness of the appeal is patent.  
See United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Kilson‟s counsel identified three potential issues for appeal in his Anders brief:  
(1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Kilson‟s conviction for conspiracy to 
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distribute cocaine; (2) whether the trial court conducted a proper inquiry into allegations 
of juror misconduct; and (3) whether the sentence imposed was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  Kilson‟s pro se brief focuses exclusively on the first issue—whether 
there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
‡
 
Although counsel‟s Anders brief contained a few glaring spelling and 
typographical errors, it indicates that he thoroughly reviewed the record and has raised all 
possible grounds for appeal.  Accordingly, we limit our independent review of the record 
to the portions of the record identified in the Anders brief, supplemented by the 
arguments in Kilson‟s pro se brief.  Youla, 241 F.3d 301.   
A. Sufficiency of Evidence  
The first issue defense counsel has identified—the one Kilson raises in his pro se 
brief—is whether the evidence presented is sufficient to support the jury‟s verdict.  While 
Kilson claims it was not, defense counsel concedes that, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Government, a rational jury could have found Kilson guilty of 
conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. 
An appellant bears a heavy burden to sustain a claim that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a jury‟s verdict.  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 
1995).  We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and 
draw all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 
318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002). 
                                              
‡
 Kilson fashions his brief around “three issues.”  Kilson really asserts only one appellate 
issue—that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
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“To establish a charge of conspiracy, the Government must show (1) a shared 
unity of purpose, (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal, and (3) an agreement to 
work toward that goal.”  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
Government must prove, moreover, that the defendant was aware that the agreement into 
which he entered “had the specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment.”  United 
States v. Cartwright,  359 F.3d 281, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, in cases charging a 
conspiracy under 28 U.S.C. § 846, there must be sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could infer that the defendant knew that the subject matter of the 
conspiracy involved drugs, rather than some other form of contraband.  Boria, 592 F.3d at 
481.  In other words, “[o]ne may not be convicted of conspiracy solely for keeping bad 
company.”  United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1977).  While each 
element of the conspiracy must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, each element may 
be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.  United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 
(3d Cir. 1988).   
Both the Anders brief and Kilson‟s pro se brief identify this Circuit‟s succession 
of cases addressing the sufficiency of the evidence in drug conspiracy cases and the 
requirement that the government present evidence from which the jury could impute 
knowledge of drugs to the defendant.  In his pro se brief, Kilson concedes that there may 
have been evidence from which to infer that he was involved in an illegal activity, but 
argues that the Government failed to present specific evidence from which a rational 
juror could infer that he had knowledge that the object of the conspiracy was drugs.  We 
disagree. 
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After a thorough independent review of the record, we find that the Government 
presented ample, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Kilson had knowledge that the 
conspiracy was about the distribution of drugs.  Without recounting the entire record, the 
jury reasonably may have relied on the following trial evidence in reaching its verdict: (1) 
Kilson‟s involvement with the delivery and tracking of the cocaine package via repeated 
telephone calls to Comegys, Daniels, and the U.S. Post Office; (2) Kilson‟s visit to the 
post office with the delivery slip left on Daniels‟ front door to obtain the package; (3) 
Kilson‟s involvement with obtaining the package when the postal agent delivered it to 
Daniels‟ trailer; (4) video evidence demonstrating Kilson‟s behavior when he and Daniels 
obtained the package; (5) evidence that Daniels placed the package of cocaine in Kilson‟s 
Mercedes, which was later confiscated from his car; and (6) Kilson‟s attempt to flee. 
The evidence obtained post-arrest also pointed to knowledge of drug distribution 
activity.  The jury heard evidence that Kilson spent time in Daniels‟ trailer at 1679 South 
State Street, that he was observed visiting the trailer alone, and that the package of 
cocaine was delivered to that address. They also heard that both crack cocaine and 
paraphernalia used to “cook” crack cocaine were found in plain view in the trailer, that a  
cell phone linked to Kilson was found in close proximity to those items, and that 78 
grams of crack cocaine were in the trailer‟s freezer.  Finally, the jury heard post-arrest 
recorded phone calls that could be interpreted as admissions of guilt, knowledge of the 
cocaine in the package, and a leadership role in the operation. 
Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, 
a reasonable jury readily could conclude that Kilson was a key player in the conspiracy 
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and had full knowledge that the conspiracy involved cocaine.  The facts here are 
distinguishable from those in the cases upon which Kilson and the Anders brief rely; 
indeed, they are materially so.  In the face of the evidence in this record, and given the 
“heavy burden” an appellant faces when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a jury verdict, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to premise an 
appeal on these grounds.
§
 
B. Juror Misconduct 
The second issue defense counsel identified is the possibility that the District 
Court did not conduct a proper inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct.  The District 
Court conducted an in camera voir dire of the two jurors in question once notified that 
one juror claimed to have overheard another juror make a disparaging remark about 
defense counsel.  The Court‟s voir dire of the jurors in question, and determination that 
no misconduct had occurred, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 265-6 (3d Cir. 2002) citing (Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Lima, 774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985)).  When the District Court has conducted 
careful and individualized voir dire examinations and determined that no misconduct or 
prejudice has occurred, this Court will defer to the District Court‟s evaluations.  See, e.g., 
                                              
§
 Kilson separately contends that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 
scope of the conspiracy involved over 500 grams of cocaine because law enforcement 
had replaced all but 100 grams of the original cocaine with a substitute before delivery of 
the package. This assertion is also frivolous; the evidence at trial was sufficient to 
establish that the original quantity of cocaine in the package was over 500 grams.  See, 
e.g. United States v. Whitted, 436 F‟Appx. 102, 104-5 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that in 
drug conspiracy cases the relevant measure is the quantity of drugs involved in the 
conspiracy as a whole) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138, 141-142 (3d Cir. 
2003)). 
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United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Clapps, 732 
F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690-92 (3d Cir. 
1993).  The Court conducted the proper examination of the two jurors and determined 
that no misconduct had occurred.  We again agree with counsel that it would have been 
frivolous to premise an appeal on this ground. 
C. Sentence Imposed 
 The third issue defense counsel identified is whether the sentence imposed was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  We review a District Court‟s sentencing decision 
for procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.  See 
United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011).  When imposing a sentence, the 
District Court must follow a three-step procedure:  (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines 
range; (2) formally rule on any departure motions and explain its rulings on such 
motions; and (3) exercise discretion in applying any relevant factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 The District Court‟s sentence was both procedurally sound and substantively 
reasonable.  The advised range of imprisonment was 210 to 262 months, with a 
mandatory minimum set at ten years, and a minimum of eight years of supervised release.  
The District Court varied downward and imposed a sentence below the Guidelines range 
after taking into account all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including 
Kilson‟s personal background.  We perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s 
analysis or conclusions.  Once more, we agree with counsel that it would have been 
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frivolous to predicate an appeal on complaints regarding the sentence imposed upon 
Kilson. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and, because 
Kilson‟s appeal presents no meritorious arguments, we affirm. 
 
